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Protecting Intellectual Property and Privacy 
in the Digital Age: The Use of National 
Cybersecurity Strategies to
Mitigate Cyber Risk 
Scott J. Shackelford*
INTRODUCTION
Days after one of the largest data breaches in U.S. 
government history, in which the private information of more 
than twenty-two million current and former federal government 
employees was compromised,1 hackers claiming an affiliation 
with Anonymous crashed several Canadian government 
websites.2 Also in mid-2015, myriad firms including Blue Cross 
Blue Shield were targeted,3 as was German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel;4 even sports teams seem to be entering the fray with the 
FBI probing the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team about 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; Edward 
Teller National Fellow, Stanford University Hoover Institution; Senior Fellow, Center for 
Applied Cybersecurity Research. An earlier version of this research was published as 
Gauging a Global Cybersecurity Market Failure: The Use of National Cybersecurity 
Strategies to Mitigate the Economic Impact of Cyber Attacks, in ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL
CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
Pascal Brangetto ed., 2015). The author recently published an article discussing critical 
infrastructure protection, cybercrime, and cybersecurity governance practices across 
thirty-four nations. See Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a State-Centric 
Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing 
Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 895 (2015). 
1 See, e.g., Ryan Evans, Why the Latest Government Hack is Worse than the 
Snowden Affair, WASH. POST (June 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
hitting-an-agency-where-it-hurts/2015/06/17/ffca6c6a-1512-11e5-9ddc-
e3353542100c_story.html [http://perma.cc/3NSF-3GA8] (“[T]he United States’ rivals and 
enemies may have the leverage they need to induce or coerce government employees and 
contractors into providing classified information.”); Mike Levine & Jack Date, 22 Million 
Affected by OPM Hack, Officials Say, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://abc 
news.go.com/US/exclusive-25-million-affected-opm-hack-sources/story?id=32332731
[http://perma.cc/ZXJ6-M738]. 
2 See Canada Government Websites Taken Down in Cyber Attack, GUARDIAN
(June 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/18/canada-government-
websites-taken-down-in-cyber-attack [http://perma.cc/5QE3-6DD5]. 
3 See Scott Dance, Cyberattack Affects 1.1 Million CareFirst Customers, BALT. SUN
(May 20, 2015, 10:03 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-bz-carefirst-data-
breach-20150520-story.html [http://perma.cc/DCV7-6AUQ]. 
4 See Computer in Merkel’s Office Hit by Cyber Attack: Report, YAHOO! NEWS
(June 14, 2015, 4:16 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/computer-merkels-office-hit-cyberattack-
report-034919582.html [http://perma.cc/Z4RJ-YRCJ]. 
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allegedly hacking into competitors’ databases.5 These events 
highlight both the tumultuous nature and diverse array of 
cyberthreats facing the public and private sectors around the 
world. Some have gone so far to argue that we are facing a 
market failure when it comes to effective, proactive cybersecurity 
management in which costs are not being effectively internalized 
to punish either bad actors or laggards.6 A similar argument 
could be made looking at an array of national governments that 
run the gambit in terms of their efforts to enhance national 
cybersecurity. Are we then facing a global cybersecurity market 
failure? And if so, what can realistically be done about it to better 
protect intellectual property and civil rights and liberties in the 
digital age?
These are questions admittedly far too large and complex to 
comprehensively tackle in this Article, or indeed in a stand-alone 
volume. However, it is possible to lay a foundation for analysis 
that helps to break some new ground in the literature while 
assessing cybersecurity best practices from the public and private 
sectors that can cross-pollinate to help promote a global culture 
of cybersecurity. In particular, this Article analyzes State 
involvement in cybersecurity, including those policies aimed at 
mitigating cyberthreats targeting intellectual property that fall 
below the armed attack threshold—namely cybercrime and 
espionage—by analyzing thirty-four national cybersecurity 
strategies across the dimensions of economic espionage, 
intellectual property theft, and civil rights and liberties.7
Although the focus is on national cybersecurity strategies, 
related domestic follow-up initiatives are also considered, 
including “voluntary” bottom-up initiatives being pursued by 
leading cyber powers like the United States and Germany, such 
as the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) Cybersecurity Framework.8 The vital role of the private 
5 See Cardinals Sin: FBI Probes St. Louis Cardinals over Alleged Cyberattack, AL
JAZEERA (June 16, 2015, 1:37 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/16/fbi-
reportedly-probes-cardinals-over-cyberattack.html [http://perma.cc/5XV3-3KWP].
6 See Robert Beeres & Myriame Bollen, An Economic Analysis of Cyber Attacks, in
CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 147, 153 (Paul Ducheine et al. eds., 2012) 
(discussing cybersecurity as a public good and, thus, we could define it as “the goods, 
services, measures and techniques [that aim] to enhance the feeling of being secure in 
cyberspace”).
7 See Helen Stacy, Professor, Stanford Univ., International Humanitarian Law 
Issues, Remarks at the Meeting of the Committee on Policy Consequences and 
Legal/Ethical Implications of Offensive Information Warfare (Apr. 11, 2007). 
8 See NIST’s Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework May Be Regarded as de Facto 
Mandatory, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.homeland 
securitynewswire.com/dr20140303-nist-s-voluntary-cybersecurity-framework-may-be-
regarded-as-de-facto-mandatory [http://perma.cc/39DQ-DN4W] (reporting on the extent to 
which NIST Framework recommendations are becoming more mandatory). 
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sector to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices is 
also considered as part of a polycentric approach to fostering 
cyber peace.9
I. ASSESSING THE CYBERTHREAT LANDSCAPE
Analyzing the cost of cyberattacks globally or to any one 
particular nation is a difficult matter, made more so by the lack 
of verifiable data and a common vocabulary. Consider the figure 
often heard that more than $1 trillion has been lost to 
cybercriminals, which has been attacked for, among other 
reasons, the methodological problems associated with 
extrapolating global trends from limited (and sometimes 
unrepresentative) survey data.10 Indeed, calculating the costs of 
attacks is also challenging for firms themselves, especially 
because of questions over the impact of a data breach on brand 
reputation, the price of downtime,11 legal liability, and costs 
associated with a “competitor’s access to confidential or 
proprietary information.”12 As a representative from TechAmerica, 
an advocacy group for the U.S. technology industry, wrote in late 
2010, such “calculations are incomplete estimates at best, and 
sorely understated at worst.”13 Even as more jurisdictions move 
toward a more robust disclosure regime, problems continue; for 
example, even though the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission has required that firms disclose “material” 
cyberattacks leading to financial losses since 2011,14 still a 
9 For more on this topic, see generally SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER
ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE
(2014).
10 Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator for R.I., Cyber Threats (July 27, 2010) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/speeches/sheldon-speaks-
in-senate-on-cyber-threats [http://perma.cc/32CA-R8Z9]); see also Peter Maass & Megha 
Rajagopalan, Does Cybercrime Really Cost $1 Trillion?, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:12 
AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/does-cybercrime-really-cost-1-trillion [http://perma.cc/ 
7BGN-QQSH] (critiquing McAfee and other estimates on which the $1 trillion figure was 
based).
11 See, e.g., Katherine O’Callaghan et al., Managing Unplanned IT Outages, CIO 
(Jan. 24, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.cio.co.nz/article/468694/managing_unplanned_it_
outages/ [http://perma.cc/4LEY-RNJ7]. 
12 Huseyin Cavusoglu, Economics of IT Security Management, in ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY 71, 74 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004). 
13 TechAmerica, Comments on Cybersecurity, Innovation and the Internet Economy 
3–4 (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/TechAmerica_Cybersecurity-NOI-
Comments_9-20-10.pdf [http://perma.cc/UW8Z-BT3K]. 
14 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC
NO. 2 CYBERSECURITY (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/
cfguidance-topic2.htm [http://perma.cc/MM2Y-MTLZ]; see also Joel Bronstein, The
Balance Between Informing Investors and Protecting Companies: A Look at the Division of 
Corporation Finance’s Recent Guidelines on Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements, 13 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 257, 271 (2012) (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976), which defined “material” as “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
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minority of publicly traded firms are offering data and even fewer 
are volunteering that it has had a significant financial impact on 
their operations.15 As a result, some have gone so far as to argue 
that financial information about cybercrime reflects only 
“approximate guesses.”16 That is a difficult starting point, 
needless to say, for policymakers and managers alike.17 Yet, that 
is the state of play at present. Thus, with those caveats, this Part 
provides some background on the cyber threat facing the global 
economy through the lens of three leading cyber powers—the 
United States, Germany, and China. 
A. Global Losses to Cyberattacks 
The true economic impact of cyberattacks is unknown, but 
contested estimates range from $400 billion to more than 
$2 trillion (which is a figure larger than estimates for the global 
illegal drugs market),18 though in truth, no one really knows for 
sure how big of a problem cyberattacks are for the reasons stated 
above.19 For example, cyberattacks are often broken down into 
four main categories: cyber terrorism, warfare, crime, and 
espionage.20 But motivations can overlap and targets abound in 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”). 
15 See Chris Strohm, Eric Engleman & David Michaels, Cyberattacks Abound Yet 
Companies Tell SEC Losses Are Few, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 3, 2013, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-04/cyberattacks-abound-yet-companies-
tell-sec-losses-are-few [http://perma.cc/3D4E-GWJ8]; cf. Andrew Collins, SEC Increases 
Scrutiny on Cyberattacks, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.sasb.org/sec-increases-scrutiny-cyberattack-disclosures/ [http://perma.cc/859R-
BP98] (“[T]he SEC has opened investigations of multiple companies, focusing on data 
security processes and disclosure on breaches (or lack of) to investors.”). 
16 Robert Richardson, 2007 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey, COMPUTER
SECURITY INST. 3, http://i.cmpnet.com/v2.gocsi.com/pdf/CSISurvey2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
T55H-N5UE].
17  Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 265, 266 (Rainer Böhme ed., 2013), http://weis2012. 
econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/45NS-92ZP]. 
18 See, e.g., CTR. STRATEGIC INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL
COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-
impact-cybercrime2.pdf [http://perma.cc/4Z6H-G4G2] [hereinafter CSIS]; see also Brian 
Taylor, Cyberattacks Fallout Could Cost the Global Economy $3 Trillion by 2020,
TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberattacks- 
fallout-could-cost-the-global-economy-3-trillion-by-2020/ [http://perma.cc/4ULX-UWQD]. 
19 See, e.g., U.S. Cybercrime Losses Double, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Mar. 16, 
2010), http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-cybercrime-losses-double [http://perma.cc/ 
F2UP-7J7M]; see also U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 127 (2005), 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7XG-SYY3] 
(estimating the “[s]ize of the global illicit drug market in 2003” at more than $320 billion); 
Robert Vamosi, The Myth of That $1 Trillion Cybercrime Figure, SECURITY WK. (Aug. 3, 
2012), http://www.securityweek.com/myth-1-trillion-cybercrime-figure [http://perma.cc/NC6R-
W2XM]. 
20 See, e.g., SCOTT CHARNEY, RETHINKING THE CYBER THREAT: A FRAMEWORK AND 
PATH FORWARD 5 (2009), http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/details.aspx?displaylang=en 
&FamilyID=062754cc-be0e-4bab-a181-077447f66877.
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cyberspace; how should one classify a state-sponsored 
cyberattack involving a criminal organization to conduct 
economic espionage, for example? Such ambiguity means that 
some estimates count trade secrets losses as cybercrime, while 
others as espionage, which is meaningful given the different legal 
avenues to pursue under each scenario. In many ways, describing 
a cyberattack, then, is in the eye of the beholder. Needless to say, 
though, cyberattacks are a large and growing problem for 
nations, firms, and ultimately, individuals around the world. The 
G20 nations were estimated to have lost $200 billion to 
cyberattacks in 2014 alone,21 though it is also telling that a 
cohesive strategy has yet to emerge from this forum—comprising 
some 85% of the global economy—to get a better handle on the 
problem.22 The elite cyber powers, though, are not fairing much 
better.
B. Impact on the Leading Cyber Powers 
There is not yet a consensus on the identity of the leading 
global cyber powers. According to Booz Allen—a consultancy—for 
example, the top three contenders are the United Kingdom, 
United States, and Australia, in that order.23 China is ranked 
thirteenth.24 However, in terms of a “cyber footprint,” the United 
States, Germany, and China are, in some ways, in a league of 
their own because of their leading technical industries and 
vulnerability to cyberattacks—the United States and Germany 
were the second and third most targeted nations as of June 19, 
2015, according to the cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Labs.25
Thus, each of these nations will be briefly discussed in turn to 
provide some context for discussion. 
1. The United States 
The United States is frequently described as being the 
nation with the greatest susceptibility to cyberattacks due to 
both the high number of insufficient networks and the presence 
of valuable—in some cases world-leading—trade secrets.26 The 
21 See Pierluigi Paganini, McAfee Report on the Global Cost of Cybercrime, SECURITY
AFF. (June 10, 2014), http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/25635/cyber-crime/mcafee-report-
global-cost-cybercrime.html [http://perma.cc/38MN-FUH9].
22 See id.
23 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER POWER
INDEX: FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGY 4 (2015), http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/ 
Cyber_Power_Index_Findings_and_Methodology.pdf [http://perma.cc/T82L-Y25P]. 
24 Id.
25 See Cyberthreat Real-Time Map, KASPERSKY LAB, http://cybermap.kaspersky.com/ 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2016). 
26 See, e.g., Sharone Tobias, 2014: The Year in Cyberattacks, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 
2014, 12:28 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014-year-cyber-attacks-295876.
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impact of these attacks on the U.S. economy is large, some say 
enormous—more than 40 million U.S. citizens were victims of 
cyberattacks in 2014 according to one McAfee survey.27 Likewise, 
a report by the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit estimates losses 
from a major attack on U.S. critical infrastructure at roughly 
$700 billion.28 Yet, despite the amount of current and potential 
loss, the U.S. government has been relatively slow at developing 
a comprehensive cybersecurity policy. In the face of congressional 
inaction, President Obama issued an executive order that, among 
other things, expanded public-private information sharing and 
established the NIST Framework comprised partly of 
private-sector best practices that companies could adopt to better 
secure critical infrastructure.29 This Framework is important 
since, even though its critics argue that it helps to solidify a 
reactive stance to the nation’s cybersecurity challenges,30 it is 
spurring the development of a standard of cybersecurity care in 
the United States and beyond.31 Whether it is enough to help 
protect the intellectual property of U.S. firms or the civil rights 
and liberties of U.S. citizens, though, remains to be seen. 
2. Germany 
According to Booz Allen, Germany “is one of only five 
countries (the others being the United Kingdom, the United 
States, France, and Japan) to have a comprehensive national 
cyber plan and a comprehensive cybersecurity plan” which is “a 
key to its success.”32 The impact of cyberattacks on the German 
economy has been severe, as it has for the United States and 
China, with a total loss for all three nations coming in at $200 
billion.33 Within Europe, Germany and the Netherlands 
27 See CSIS, supra note 18, at 3. 
28 See JAYSON M. SPADE, CHINA’S CYBER POWER AND AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY
26 (Jeffrey L. Caton ed., 2012) (citing EUGENE E. HABIGER, CYBERWARFARE AND 
CYBERTERRORISM: THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH 15–17 (2010)). 
29 See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1
(2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/QK8T-NY7U] [hereinafter NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK].
30 Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework Receives Mixed 
Reviews, CSO (Jan. 31, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/
security-leadership/nist-s-finalized-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html 
[http://perma.cc/4MNM-V9E9].  
31 See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of 
Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping 
Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 
310 (2015). 
32 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 23, at 3. 
33 See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Report: Cybercrime and Espionage 
Costs $445 Billion Annually, WASH. POST (June 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/report-cybercrime-and-espionage-costs-445-billion-annually/2014/
06/08/8995291c-ecce-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html [http://perma.cc/5XC3-3LFP]. 
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particularly stand out for their losses to cybercriminals.34 In sum, 
by some estimates Germany is losing approximately 1.6% of its 
GDP to cyberattacks annually.35 Yet the German response to 
such cyber insecurity has been impressive. In particular, the 
federal government approved the German Cybersecurity 
Strategy (Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland) in 
February 2011. The “[s]trategy recognizes cyberspace as an 
essential domain for the German state, economy, and society, and 
emphasizes the protection of critical infrastructure as a core 
cybersecurity policy priority.”36 Germany has also been active in 
identifying and spreading cybersecurity best practices in a 
similar vein as the NIST Framework. The Federal Office for 
Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, or “BSI”) first released its IT Baseline 
Protection (IT-Grundschutz) in 1994.37 This set of BSI standards 
contains recommendations for cybersecurity and has been 
adopted by German corporations and international stakeholders; 
some of the standards are now available in English, Swedish, and 
Estonian. In summary, Germany’s comprehensive approach to 
cybersecurity policymaking stands in contrast to both the United 
States and China and has earned top marks for being the most 
robust cybersecurity legal environment in the world.38
3. China 
Although much of the attention, especially in the Western 
press, has been paid to Chinese cyberattackers targeting the 
trade secrets of advanced firms, including those based in the 
United States and Germany, China is also a leading victim of 
cyberattacks; it is the second largest economy in the world with 
the most Internet users of any nation on Earth—some 640 
million as of June 2015—more than double the number of U.S. 
citizens online.39 Yet, as with the United States, China’s 
cybersecurity strategy remains fragmented, even as its 
34 See CSIS, supra note 18, at 9. 
35 See id.
36 Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International 
Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Private Sector (Chi. J. Int’l L. 
Research Paper No. 15-64, 2015) (representing the first publication of portions of these 
case studies); see also Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland, FED. MINISTRY
INTERIOR (2015), http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/IT-Netzpolitik/IT-Cybersicherheit/
Cybersicherheitsstrategie/cybersicherheitsstrategie_node.html [http://perma.cc/8AWD-
JME5].
37 See Carsten Schulz, BSI Offers Free IT Baseline Protection Manual, Solicits 
Comments, IEEE COMPUTER SECURITY (1997), http://www.ieee-security.org/Cipher/ 
Newsbriefs/1997/971004.bsiITmanual.html [http://perma.cc/CJG4-R6EN]. 
38 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 23, at 5.
39 See Internet Users by Country (2014), INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internet 
livestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ [http://perma.cc/8Q7WG-CVCL]. 
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development and implementation has recently garnered political 
support of high-ranking senior government officials.40 Among the 
actions taken in China’s current cybersecurity strategy are 
enhanced critical infrastructure protections “addressing China’s 
dependency on foreign technology as a security issue, the 
promotion of Chinese cryptography standards, the build-up of 
broadband infrastructure, next-generation mobile technology, 
and e-government services.”41 Civil liberties and, until relatively 
recently, intellectual property protection have not been priorities 
for the Chinese government.42 Indeed, China’s official government 
position remains that “[p]roperly guiding Internet opinion is a 
major measure for protecting Internet information security.”43
Yet even with this broad scope of state-centric regulation, as 
compared to the more bottom-up NIST Framework and BSI 
Standards, China’s efforts have been criticized as lacking 
effective enforcement or being otherwise misguided,44 which may 
help explain China’s lower cyber power rating relative to the 
United States or Germany.45
C.  Summary 
Although the onus is on the cyber powers in many ways to be 
norm entrepreneurs and enhance global cybersecurity, there is 
no island in cyberspace. Nations around the world have a role to 
play in combating this global collective action problem. Yet as we 
40 See China Must Evolve from a Large Internet Nation to a Powerful Internet 
Nation, XINHUANET (Feb. 27, 2014, 8:43 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-
02/27/c_119538788.htm [http://perma.cc/4DZ8-TEYQ]. 
41 Shackelford, Russell & Kuehn, supra note 36, at 20; see also Hauke Johannes 
Gierow, Cyber Security in China: New Political Leadership Focuses on Boosting National 
Security, 20 MERCATOR INST. CHINA STUD.: CHINA MONITOR, Dec. 9, 2014, at 1, 2, 
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_2 
0_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2LX-7V24]. China is far from alone in seeking to protect its 
domestic industry in the name of enhancing cybersecurity. See Karen Kornbluh, Beyond
Borders: Fighting Data Protectionism, 34 DEMOCRACY J. (2014), http://democracyjournal.org/ 
magazine/34/beyond-borders-fighting-data-protectionism/?page=all [http://perma.cc/GW49-
59RD]; Scott J. Shackelford, How to Enhance Cybersecurity and Create American Jobs,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-j-
shackelford/how-to-enhance-cybersecurity_b_1673860.html [http://perma.cc/WUB3-C6E4]. 
42 See China to Further Strengthen Intellectual Property Rights Protection, CHINA
BRIEFING (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/03/26/china-to-further-
strengthen-intellectual-property-rights-protection.html [http://perma.cc/G2F2-PLJE]. 
43 Chris Buckley & Lucy Hornby, China Defends Censorship After Google Threat,
REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2010, 9:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-china-
usa-google-idUSTRE60C1TR20100114 [http://perma.cc/2G8E-7VUD].
44 See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The ‘Chilling Effect’ of China’s New Cybersecurity 
Regime, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-new-
cybersecurity-law-internet-security/ [http://perma.cc/TJD7-3TZX]. 
45 For more background on the comparative regulation of critical infrastructure, see 
generally Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New “Digital 
Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and 
Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014). 
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will see in Part II, the extent to which developed and developing 
nations alike are meeting this burden runs the gambit, opening 
the door for other potentially more innovative stakeholders, 
including the private sector.  
II. THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES
Those, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook, who advocate “that 
efficiency is the desired outcome” of the law and that the free 
“market is the most desirable route to such efficiency,” believe 
that regulation displaces competition and can even “defeat the 
market altogether.”46 However, some regulatory room is left even 
among free-market proponents to correct market imperfections.47
The question then is which, if any, of the cyber powers, or other 
developed and developing nations, have gotten this cybersecurity 
regulatory balance right? Although a global analysis of 
cybersecurity regulation is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
focus here is on national cybersecurity strategies as a guide for 
better understanding the national strategic focus of these nations 
to guide the development of twenty-first century cyberspace. In 
all, thirty-four nations are investigated particularly as their 
policies relate to the economic impact of cyberattacks—including 
espionage mitigation and intellectual property protection—along 
with associated privacy and civil liberties issues.48 First, though, 
a few notes are offered on methodology, as well as on the birth 
and evolution of national cybersecurity strategies, to provide a 
framework for discussion. 
A. A Note on Methodology 
The affirmative choice was made to conduct this targeted 
survey so as to analyze the thirty-four (“G34”) published national 
cybersecurity strategies representing those nations with 
cybersecurity strategies in place and available in English as of 
46 ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT 165–66 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47 Id. at 166. But see Jerry Brito & Tate Watkins, Loving the Cyber Bomb? The 
Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 39, 82 
(2011) (making the case against there being a cybersecurity market failure); Eli Dourado, 
Is There a Cybersecurity Market Failure? (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 12–05, 2012) (arguing that market failures are not so common in the 
cybersecurity realm). 
48 For more background on methodology and other related issues, such as 
cybercrime, critical infrastructure protection, and governance, see Scott J. Shackelford 
& Andraz Kastelic, Toward A State-Centric Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National 
Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 895 (2015) (representing a comparative study of national cybersecurity strategies 
focusing on critical infrastructure protection, cybercrime, and governance). 
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 57 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 57 Side B      05/09/2016   12:16:02
C M
Y K
Do Not Delete 4/23/16 9:50 AM 
454 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 19:2
September 2014.49 These data were amassed from the European 
Union and NATO; all of the information is publicly available.50
Documentation of key findings is included in Appendices A and 
B. It should also be noted that the following study only analyzes 
the instances in which certain key phrases were used in the 
national cybersecurity strategies, such a “trade secrets.” More 
nuanced and methodologically sophisticated work is needed to 
unpack and compare these findings in greater detail. 
B. Birth and Evolution of National Cybersecurity Strategies 
In general, it could be said that national cybersecurity 
strategies stem from at least three needs. First, cybersecurity 
requires flexible adaptations beyond traditional security theory 
transposed to cyberspace. Volumes of unstructured data, 
inhumanly short time scales, and difficulties in attribution, 
among other challenges, mean that simplistic institutional 
models based on one-sided liability schemes, the arbitrary 
separation of public and private interests, or a focus solely on 
malevolent actors as the source of risk, are likely to do more 
harm than good due to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Second, a cybersecurity strategy is a political act; it creates 
expectations and raises awareness among businesses and civil 
society. However, when addressing cybersecurity, governments 
need to answer the question of whether the competitive market 
can effectively enhance cybersecurity without regulatory 
interference, or whether policymakers must intervene to address 
market failures. Cybersecurity is structured in layers with 
incidents ranging from “people may die” to “people may lose trust 
in e-commerce” that require adapted answers and the 
involvement of many actors, thus rendering governance of 
cybersecurity difficult, as shown by the ambiguity in many of the 
cybersecurity strategies surveyed. Third, trust and “fair” 
governance must be strengthened such as by promoting 
impartiality, reflexivity, and proximity; cybersecurity may be 
49 It should be noted that three additional nations—Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
Romania—also had strategies in place at this time, but they were not available in English 
as of this writing. We used Google Translate to help identify some of the relevant 
passages for other researchers, but kept those data out of our primary analysis to help 
ensure consistency. The countries analyzed are: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Norway, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
50 See National Cyber Security Strategies in the World, ENISA, http://www.enisa. 
europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/national- 
cyber-security-strategies-in-the-world [http://perma.cc/2FGK-T7CG]; Strategies and Policies,
NATO CCDCOE, https://www.ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html [http://perma.cc/527M-
R94W].
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seen as a factor impairing the openness of the Internet if 
incentives are not aligned.  
Despite the need for comprehensive, transparent, and robust 
national cybersecurity strategies, they were relatively slow to get 
going. For example, the United States in many ways pioneered 
national cybersecurity, beginning with the creation of the first 
Cyber Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) in 1988.51 However, 
it was not the United States, but Russia that enacted among the 
first of what could be considered national cybersecurity strategies 
in 2000. Since then, though, the pace has picked up considerably 
with 2013 being the busiest year studied to date.52 Still, while 
many of these new strategies have a great deal in common, they 
still diverge in myriad aspects including in the related areas of 
economic espionage, intellectual property protection, and civil 
rights, as is discussed next.  
C. Analysis of National Cybersecurity Strategies 
This section briefly reviews the G34 national cybersecurity 
strategies analyzed across the dimensions of economic espionage, 
intellectual property protection, and civil rights, with the goal of 
determining those areas in which practices may be converging, 
giving rise to opportunities for norm development to help 
promote cyber peace. 
1. Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property Protection 
Despite the attention paid to the dangers of economic 
espionage and trade secrets theft, many nations pay little if any 
attention to this aspect of the multifaceted cyberthreat in their 
national cybersecurity strategies. Only Russia’s, for example, 
explicitly uses the term “trade secret.” This is surprising given 
both the importance of trade secrets, comprising much of the 
value of many leading firms, as well as the substantial (and 
well-publicized) risk of cyberattackers poaching this invaluable 
and often hard-won intellectual property.53 However, eleven 
nations (32%) did discuss the importance of intellectual property 
protections more generally,54 while four nations (12%) referenced 
51 See About Us, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, https://www.us-
cert.gov/about-us [http://perma.cc/Q96X-L3LL]; see also SHACKELFORD, supra note 9, at 3. 
52 For more information on how this timeline breaks down, see Figure 5 in 
Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 48, at 926. 
53 See, e.g., Robert Hackett, Diplomacy Is Failing to Protect the United States’ Trade 
Secrets, FORTUNE (May 11, 2015, 1:51 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/11/diplomacy-is-
failing-to-protect-the-united-states-trade-secrets/ [http://perma.cc/9JHF-M2DQ]. 
54 See infra Appendix A (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Canada, 
Estonia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Qatar, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States). 
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patents.55 All of the strategies at least mentioned the economic 
impact of cyberattacks. As for the causes of intellectual property 
theft, sixteen nations (47%) referenced the threat that espionage 
poses to the well-being of their national economies (as compared 
to 68% that discuss cybercrime perhaps owing to the sometimes 
more opaque nature of espionage).56 Only four nations (12%) 
explicitly used the phrase “economic espionage” in their national 
cybersecurity strategies.57
Figure 1: Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property 
Protection Dimension Summary Chart58
2. Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
The difficulty of managing cyberattacks is oftentimes 
discussed as a balancing act between ensuring privacy and 
promoting cybersecurity.59 That is one reason why cybersecurity 
reform legislation has been so contentious in the U.S. Congress, 
55 See id. (these nations include: Australia, Italy, New Zealand, and Russia).
56 See id. (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States). For more information on how cybercrime is 
treated across these strategies, see Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 48, at 916–19.
57 See infra Appendix A (these nations include: Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom). 
58 See id.
59 See, e.g., Melissa Riofrio, It’s Privacy Versus Cybersecurity as CISPA Bill Arrives 
in Senate, PCWORLD (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036328/it-
s-privacy-versus-cybersecurity-as-cispa-bill-arrives-in-senate.html [http://perma.cc/5YGA-
9E9Z].
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such as with the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(“CISPA”), which aimed to boost information sharing to better 
manage cyberattacks; however, concerns arose regarding the 
type and quantity of personal information being shared.60 Part of 
the difficulty arising in the U.S. context is that privacy itself is 
such a multi-faceted concept, meaning different things to 
different stakeholders. It encompasses (among much else) 
freedom of thought, of bodily integrity, solitude, information 
integrity, and the protection of reputation and personality.61
Countries around the world strike the balance between the 
protection of individual privacy and security in varied ways that 
flex as perceived national emergencies and social trends ebb and 
flow.62 This is seen in the national cybersecurity strategies 
surveyed. For example, twenty-two nations (65%) discussed 
“privacy” in their national cybersecurity strategies.63 Such a high 
percentage may owe to the fact that many nations agree in 
principle that the individual’s right to privacy is a human right 
recognized in international treaties, including the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,64 and a 2013 U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution that unanimously backed a “right to privacy in the 
digital age” in the aftermath of former NSA contractor Edward 
Snowden’s revelations.65 Other areas of agreement between the 
strategies include seventeen countries (47%) referencing “civil 
rights,”66 while seven nations (21%) discuss “civil liberties” 
broadly.67 This may be because “civil rights” create “legal actions 
60 See id.
61 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 
(2002) (advocating a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy). 
62 See Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of 
Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest—The Proper Balance,
37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 28–30 (2004) (recognizing that national tragedies can cause 
legal responses that limit privacy in extreme and irrational ways). 
63 See infra Appendix B (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States). 
64 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 12 (Dec. 10, 
1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”); see also G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6456, at art. 17 (Dec. 16, 1966) (reiterating text from Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights). 
65 General Assembly Backs Right to Privacy in Digital Age, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Dec. 19, 
2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46780&Cr=privacy&Cr1=#.UtKxr
PYjBkU [http://perma.cc/P3CU-JFBH]. 
66 See infra Appendix B (these nations include: Australia, Austria, Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Italy, Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
67 See id. (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Hungary, Italy, Romania, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States). 
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that the government takes to create equal conditions for all 
people,” whereas “civil liberties” refer “to protections against 
government actions,” a perhaps more thorny topic that more 
nations seem unwilling or unable to tackle in their national 
cybersecurity strategies.68 Relatedly, 56% of the G34 discuss 
information sharing as an integral strategy for managing 
cyberattacks generally, though not necessarily within the context 
of civil rights.69
Figure 2: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Dimension Summary Chart70
C. Summary 
There is a growing consensus that nations bear increasing 
responsibility for enhancing cybersecurity. Although a growing 
number of countries seem to be recognizing this fact by enacting 
national cybersecurity strategies, many are written as broad 
vision statements rather than comprehensive and concrete 
frameworks for enhancing national cybersecurity. More nations 
should emulate norm entrepreneurs such as Saudi Arabia, which 
has a detailed report of more than 100 pages in length, laying out 
its cybersecurity posture in great detail. Still, broad vision 
statements, while important, should be considered as merely one 
aspect of a global campaign to correct market failures 
surrounding cybersecurity. Hence, it is vital to focus not only on 
nations but also on other stakeholders, including the private 
sector, as part of a polycentric strategy to manage cyberattacks. 
In that perspective, businesses play a vital role in promoting 
cyber peace, such as by identifying and spreading cybersecurity 
best practices. 
68 Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties, STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES (Oct. 18, 2013), 
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford-journal-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-sjcrcl/online/
civil-rights-vs-civil-liberties [http://perma.cc/UU7H-W79G]. 
69 For more information on how information sharing is treated across these strategies, 
see Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 48, at 913. 
70 See infra Appendix B. 
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS IN 
ENHANCING GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY
Space constraints prohibit a thorough rendering of the 
importance of active private-sector engagement to help create a 
global culture of cybersecurity.71 However, two areas are briefly 
considered to help enrich the discussion. First is the necessity of 
investing in proactive cybersecurity best practices rather than 
relying on a reactive stance. Second is the NIST Framework, 
which is examined as an arguably successful mechanism for 
fostering public-private cooperation to enhance national 
cybersecurity.
A. Proactive Cybersecurity Best Practices 
Proactive does not mean “hack back,” which runs afoul of a 
wide array of national cybercrime laws including the U.S. 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.72 Instead, the proactive 
cybersecurity movement includes technological best practices 
ranging from real-time analytics to cybersecurity audits 
promoting built-in resilience,73 and may be considered to be a 
response to the more reactive stance of an array of companies.74
Market leaders such as Microsoft and Google have helped to 
popularize such tactics as advanced threat intelligence sharing, 
enabling security companies to reasonably predict access 
attempts by malicious actors rather than guard against already 
known malicious traffic. Such an approach represents an 
opportunity for firms to create broad, collective defense 
partnerships; however, with whom and how intelligence is 
shared will impact both the success of those partnerships and 
how private-sector security actors shape evolving polycentric 
governance structures discussed in Part IV.75 Likewise, many of 
71 For more on this topic, see SHACKELFORD, supra note 9, at 3. 
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
73 See, e.g., Hackback? Claptrap!—An Active Defense Continuum for the Private 
Sector, RSA CONF. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us14/agenda/ 
sessions/1146/hackback-claptrap-an-active-defense-continuum-for [http://perma.cc/PM3S-
EF2Z] (“[A]ctive defense should be viewed as a diverse set of techniques along a spectrum 
of varying risk and legality.”); see also Orla Cox, Proactive Cybersecurity – Taking Control 
Away from Attackers, SYMANTEC CONNECT (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.symantec.com/ 
connect/blogs/proactive-cybersecurity-taking-control-away-attackers [http://perma.cc/35TW-
R37E]; Michael A. Davis, 4 Steps for Proactive Cybersecurity, INFO. WK. (Jan. 18, 2013, 
12:25 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/4-steps-for-pro 
active-cyber security/d/d-id/1108270 [http://perma.cc/G4L7-BLTF]. 
74 For more on this topic, see SCOTT DYNES, INFORMATION SECURITY INVESTMENT
CASE STUDY: THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR (2006), http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cds-
uploads/research-projects/pdf/InfoSecManufacturing.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QG5-SZ24]. 
75 For more background on the proactive cybersecurity movement, see Amanda N. 
Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & Janine S. Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative 
Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015). 
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these same companies are involved in the race for better 
encryption to help safeguard their customers’ data from 
unwanted intrusions in the wake of former NSA contractor 
Edward Snowden’s leaks.76 This is pitting Silicon Valley against 
the law enforcement community, fearing that in the name of 
protecting civil rights, national security may be compromised.77
At the national level, industry collaboration is impacting the 
ways in which cybersecurity is being conceptualized and 
regulated, as was seen with the development of the NIST 
Framework introduced above.78
B. Case Study: NIST Framework 
The difficulty of forming effective cybersecurity regulatory 
interventions is high, as is the cost if things go wrong. Hence, in 
part to avoid the regulatory confusion, more jurisdictions are 
moving toward bottom-up approaches to mitigate cyber risk. One 
such approach is the NIST Framework; first announced as an 
executive order in February 2013, the Framework version 1.0, 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,
was released in February 2014.79 The NIST Framework 
harmonizes consensus standards and industry best practices to 
provide, its proponents argue, a flexible and cost-effective 
approach to enhancing cybersecurity that assists owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure in assessing and managing 
cyber risk.80 Yet the Framework also has its detractors. Some, for 
example, have cautioned that the Framework does not go far 
enough in terms of its scope, influence, or impact.81 One of the 
main questions surrounding the NIST Framework is how 
“voluntary” it will actually turn out to be—as well as how 
76 See, e.g., Alan Rusbridger & Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden Urges 
Professionals to Encrypt Client Communications, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2014, 12:14 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/edward-snowden-professionals-encrypt-
client-communications-nsa-spy [http://perma.cc/5HUZ-F6CS]. 
77 See Dina Temple-Raston, FBI Director Brings Silicon Valley Encryption Fight to 
Capitol Hill, NPR (July 8, 2015, 6:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225069/fbi-
director-brings-silicon-valley-encryption-fight-to-capitol-hill [http://perma.cc/WH9Y-AW58]. 
78 See supra Section I.B.1. 
79 NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 29, at 1. 
80 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,741 
(Feb. 12, 2013). 
81 See, e.g., Tony Romm, Cybersecurity Still in Slow Lane, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2014, 
10:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/cybersecurity-in-slow-lane-one-year-
after-obama-order-103307.html?hp=f1 [http://perma.cc/8ZT4-K572] (“Nearly a year after 
President Barack Obama issued an executive order to improve the cybersecurity of the 
nation’s vital assets, the administration doesn’t have much to show: The government is 
about to produce only some basic standards, with little incentive for the private sector to 
participate.”); see also Mark Clayton, Why Obama’s Executive Order on Cybersecurity 
Doesn’t Satisfy Most Experts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0213/Why-Obama-s-executive-order-on-cyber 
security-doesn-t-satisfy-most-experts [http://perma.cc/5TET-5DK6]. 
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voluntary it should be—questions that turn in part on the extent 
to which a market failure is occurring in the global cybersecurity 
arena.82 Yet, the NIST Framework is already having an impact, 
both in the U.S. context, in terms of identifying and reinforcing 
industry best practices, and beyond.83 Indeed, already some 
private-sector clients are receiving the advice that if their 
“cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during litigation or 
a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for ‘due diligence’ was 
now the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.”84 This could arguably 
be an instance, then, of cybersecurity regulation occurring from 
the bottom-up, with this Framework helping to identify best 
practices and punish market participants that fail to follow 
them—which may help to better safeguard both intellectual 
property and civil rights both in the United States and beyond as 
part of a polycentric approach to fostering cyber peace. 
IV. A POLYCENTRIC END GAME? ASSESSING THE 
PROSPECTS FOR CYBER PEACE
No nation is an island in cyberspace, even if some may wish 
they were.85 Thus, a multifaceted, multi-stakeholder approach to 
global cybersecurity policymaking is required, which may be 
considered a polycentric undertaking. This final part discusses 
the literature on polycentric governance as a vehicle to promoting 
cyber peace and, in so doing, helping safeguard both privacy and 
intellectual property. 
A. Introducing Polycentric Governance 
The field of polycentric governance has been built up over 
some decades by the work of an array of eminent scholars led by 
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom. 
This multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multi-sectoral 
model86 that challenges orthodoxy by demonstrating the benefits 
82 See, e.g., NIST’s Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework May Be Regarded as de 
Facto Mandatory, supra note 8 (stating that experts have warned that many of the 
recommendations in the framework “may be used by courts, regulators, and even 
consumers to hold institutions accountable for failures that could have been prevented if 
the cybersecurity framework had been fully implemented by the respective institution”). 
83 See EU Eying NIST Framework with ‘Great Interest,’ INSIDE CYBERSECURITY,
http://insidecybersecurity.com/daily-news/official-eu-eying-nist-framework-great-interest 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2016). 
84 John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary,
PIVOTPOINT SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/risky-business/
nist-cybersecurity-framework [http://perma.cc/48UL-8CHB]. 
85 See, e.g., 10 Most Censored Countries, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS,
https://cpj.org/2015/04/10-most-censored-countries.php [http://perma.cc/L6YN-D2LL]. 
86 Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom 
Workshop, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163, 171–72 (2011), http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/ 
iad_guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/769K-K32S] (defining polycentricity as “a system of 
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of self-organization, networking regulations “at multiple 
scales,”87 and examining the extent to which national and private 
control can in some cases coexist with communal management, 
as may be seen in the success of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (“IETF”).88 It also posits that, due to the existence of free 
riders in a multipolar world, “a single governmental unit” is often 
incapable of managing “global collective action problems,”89 such 
as cyberattacks. Instead, a polycentric approach recognizes that 
diverse organizations working at multiple governance scales from 
companies to national governments to bilateral and regional 
alliances can create policies that can increase levels of 
cooperation and compliance, enhancing “flexibility across issues 
and adaptability over time.”90
Although much of the fieldwork comprising polycentric 
governance was conducted in the domestic context, such as 
involving the governance of marine fisheries or commonly held 
pastures, the notion has more recently been applied to a range of 
global collective action problems, including climate change and 
cyberattacks.91 The notion even seems to be diffusing beyond 
academia. The likes of the President of Estonia, Toomas Ilves, 
and the head of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (“ICANN”), Fadi Chehadé, have used the term 
“polycentric” to describe an end game for Internet governance.92
Such a model feeds off both public- and private-sector 
governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) 
interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens 
subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put 
upon their activities for public purposes”). 
87 Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action 
Problems 1 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper 
Series No. 08–6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W08-
6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/BF4K-B534]. 
88 The IETF is responsible for managing the communications side of the Internet 
through voluntary mechanisms for fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration. For more 
background on IETF and the extent to which it may be considered a successful polycentric 
undertaking, see Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New “Digital 
Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of Governments in Internet Governance and 
Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014). 
89 Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/ 
pe/2009/04268.pdf [http://perma.cc/N2BF-VSUE]. 
90 Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 
PERSP. POL. 7, 9 (2011); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008) 
(discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes, and arguing that “[a]ll regulatory 
regimes are polycentric to varying degrees”). 
91 See Ostrom, supra note 89; see also SHACKELFORD, supra note 9.
92 See Nancy Scola, ICANN Chief: “The Whole World is Watching” the U.S.’s Net 
Neutrality Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/10/07/internet-operations-chief-snowden-disclosures-make-my-job-easier/ 
[http://perma.cc/2BQB-H479]. 
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experimentation in which actors can learn about what works, 
and does not work, in the field of cybersecurity management 
without risking top-down governance structures crowding out 
such bottom-up innovative efforts. According to Professor Ron 
Diebert and Masashi Crete-Nishihata, “states learn from and 
imitate” one another, and “[t]he most intense forms of imitation 
and learning occur around national security issues because of the 
high stakes and urgency involved.”93 Due to the common 
perception on the part of many policymakers that cyber risk is 
“escalating out of control,” an opportunity exists to engage in a 
constructive, polycentric dialogue on norm building to promote 
cyber peace.94
B. Toward Cyber Peace 
The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), a U.N. 
agency specializing in information and communication 
technologies, pioneered some of the early work in the field by 
defining “cyber peace” in part as “a universal order of cyberspace” 
built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the absence of disorder 
or disturbance and violence . . . .”95 Although certainly desirable, 
such an outcome is politically and technically unlikely, at least in 
the near term.96 That is why cyber peace is defined here not as 
the absence of conflict, a state of affairs that may be called 
negative cyber peace.97 Rather, it is the construction of a network 
93 Ronald J. Deibert & Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Global Governance and the Spread 
of Cyberspace Controls, 18 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 339, 350 (2012). 
94 James Andrew Lewis, Confidence-Building and International Agreement in 
Cybersecurity, in DISARMAMENT FORUM: CONFRONTING CYBERCONFLICT 51, 51–53 
(Kerstin Vignard, Ross McRae & Jason Powers eds., 2011). Though norms do not bind 
states like a treaty, Lewis notes that “[n]on-proliferation provides many examples of 
non-binding norms that exercise a powerful influence on state behavior.” Id. at 53. This 
position has also been supported by other scholars. See, e.g., Roger Hurwitz, An
Augmented Summary of the Harvard, MIT and U. of Toronto Cyber Norms Workshop 5 
(2012), http://citizenlab.org/cybernorms/augmented-summary.pdf (“At the very least, acceptance 
of a norm by a state puts the state’s reputation at risk. If it fails to follow the norm, other 
states which accept that norm, will typically demand an explanation or account, rather 
than ignoring the violation or dismissing it as self-interested behavior.”). 
95 Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 82 (Int’l 
Telecomm. Union & Permanent Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec., 2011), http://www.itu.int/ 
dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y2PC-FPGQ]. For 
more on the topic of cyber peace generally, see SHACKELFORD, supra note 9.
96 To its credit, though, the ITU report recognizes this fact, and that the concept of 
cyber peace should be broad and malleable given an ever-changing political climate and 
cyber threat landscape. Henning Wegener, supra note 95, at 78 (“The definition [of cyber 
peace] cannot be watertight, but must be rather intuitive, and incremental in its list of 
ingredients.”).
97 The notion of negative peace has been applied in diverse contexts, including civil 
rights. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Non-violence and Racial Justice, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Feb. 6, 1957, at 118, 119 (“True peace is not merely the absence of some negative 
force—tension, confusion or war; it is the presence of some positive force—justice, good 
will and brotherhood.”). 
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of multi-level regimes that promote global, just, and sustainable 
cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies 
and countries alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict, 
crime, and espionage to levels comparable to other business and 
national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach to 
cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the 
public and private sectors to enhance cybersecurity due diligence. 
Working together through polycentric partnerships, we can 
mitigate the risk of cyberwar by laying the groundwork for a 
positive cyber peace that respects human rights including 
privacy, spreads Internet access along with best practices to help 
safeguard valuable intellectual property, and strengthens 
governance mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder 
collaboration.98
CONCLUSION 
This Article has assessed the extent to which national 
cybersecurity strategies are addressing the economic impact of 
cyberthreats as part of a larger discussion on the appropriate role 
for the State in regulating cybersecurity, particularly in the 
fields of protecting intellectual property and civil rights and 
liberties. Overall, we have found that, although more nations are 
publishing national cybersecurity strategies that discuss common 
concerns such as cybercrime, only a minority discuss the 
importance of protecting intellectual property generally, and far 
fewer trade secrets in particular. Likewise, though privacy is 
discussed by a supermajority of nations in their cybersecurity 
strategies, fewer discuss civil rights, and even less engage with 
civil liberties protections. Consequently, it may prove fruitful to 
look beyond national cybersecurity policymaking if progress is to 
be made toward enhancing global cybersecurity such as by 
engaging with the private-sector to help instill an array of 
proactive best practices, such as that which may now be 
occurring under the guise of the NIST Framework, which 
98 See Johan Galtung, Peace, Positive and Negative, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEACE
PSYCHOLOGY 760, 760–62 (Daniel J. Christie ed., 2011) (comparing the concepts of 
negative and positive peace). Definitions of positive peace vary depending on context, but 
the overarching issue in the cybersecurity space is the need to address structural 
problems in all forms, including the root causes of cyber insecurity, such as economic and 
political inequities and legal ambiguities, as well as working to build a culture of peace. 
Id. “The goal is to build a structure based on reciprocity, equal rights, benefits, and 
dignity . . . and a culture of peace, confirming and stimulating an equitable economy and 
an equal polity.” Id. at 761; see also A Declaration on A Culture of Peace, UNESCO, 
A/Res/53/243, www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/2000.htm [http://perma.cc/22DW-GBQX] 
(offering a discussion of the prerequisites for creating a culture of peace including 
education, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and the “promotion of the rights of everyone to 
freedom of expression, opinion and information”).
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includes a set of privacy best practices.99 Over time, the success 
of this Framework and others could help promote legal 
harmonization and pave the way for norm convergence, or even a 
norm cascade, including in the fields of trade secrets theft and 
privacy.100 But the road will be long, even as the destination may 
now be coming into sharper relief. Ultimately, we all have a role 
in safeguarding both privacy and intellectual property in the 
digital age as part of a polycentric, all-of-the-above approach to 
fostering cyber peace in an age of seemingly endless cyber 
insecurity.
99 See NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 29, at 15–16. 
100 See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998). 
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Appendix A: Non-comprehensive Review of  
Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property  
Protection from G34 Nations 
Country
Name
Year
Title of 
Cybersecurity
Strategy
Quoted Language & 
Provisions101
Armenia 2005 Armenia National 
Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace
Armenia’s enemies may conduct 
espionage on our Government, 
university research centers, and 
private companies. They may also 
seek to prepare for cyber strikes 
during a confrontation by mapping 
Armenia information systems, 
identifying key targets, and lacing 
our infrastructure with back doors 
and other means of access. In 
wartime or crisis, adversaries may 
seek to intimidate the country’s 
political leaders by attacking 
critical infrastructures and key 
economic functions or eroding 
public confidence in information 
systems. (P.3) 
Cyber attacks on Armenia 
information networks can have 
serious consequences such as 
disrupting critical operations, 
causing loss of revenue and 
intellectual property, or loss of life. 
Countering such attacks requires 
the development of robust 
capabilities where they do not exist 
today if we are to reduce 
vulnerabilities and deter those with 
the capabilities and intent to harm 
our critical infrastructures. (P.3) 
Australia 2009 Australian
Government Cyber 
Security Strategy 
The Statement indicates electronic 
espionage, both commercial and 
state-based, will be a growing 
vulnerability as the Australian 
Government and society become 
more dependent on integrated 
information technologies. It states 
that this challenge must and will 
be met with full vigour and 
identifies cyber security as amongst 
the Australian Government’s top 
tier national security priorities. 
(P.4)
The Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) 
responsibilities are defined by the 
 101 All material is quoted directly from the listed cybersecurity strategy. 
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Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 and, in 
relation to cyber security, include: 
• Investigating electronic attacks 
conducted for purpose of espionage, 
sabotage, terrorism or other forms 
of politically motivated violence, 
attacks on the defence system and 
other matters that fall under the 
heads of security in the ASIO Act
(P.29)
Australia is vulnerable to the loss 
of economic competitiveness 
through the continued exploitation 
of ICT networks and the 
compromise of intellectual property 
and other sensitive commercial 
data. This has the potential to 
undermine Australians’ confidence 
in the digital economy. (P.4) 
Austria 2013 Austrian Cyber 
Security Strategy 
The term “cyber attack” refers to an 
attack through IT in cyber space, 
which is directed against one or 
several IT system(s). Its aim is to 
undermine the objectives of ICT 
security protection (confidentiality, 
integrity and availability) partly or 
totally. Cyber attacks directed 
against the confidentiality of an IT 
system are referred to as “cyber 
espionage,” i.e. digital spying. 
Cyber attacks directed against the 
integrity and availability of an IT 
system are referred to as cyber 
sabotage. (P.20) 
Belgium 2014 Cyber Security 
Strategy
The text is only available in French 
and Dutch.
Canada 2010 Cyber Security 
Strategy
Canadian organizations had 
suffered a cyber attack. The loss of 
intellectual property as a result of 
these attacks doubled between 
2006 and 2008. (P.4) 
The most sophisticated cyber 
threats come from the intelligence 
and military services of foreign 
states. In most cases, these 
attackers are well resourced, 
patient and persistent. Their 
purpose is to gain political, 
economic, commercial or military 
advantage. (P.5) 
Czech
Republic
2011 Cybersecurity
Strategy of the 
Czech Republic 
N/A 
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Denmark 2012 Danish Defense 
Agreement 2013–17 
N/A 
Estonia 2008 Cyber Security 
Strategy
Other forms of cyber crime include 
harassment, fraud, the distribution 
of illegal materials or the violation 
of intellectual property rights. 
(P.11)
Finland 2013 Cyber Security 
Strategy
N/A 
France 2011 Information
Systems Defense 
and Security 
Cyberspace, like a virtual 
battleground, has become a place 
for confrontation: appropriation of 
personal data, espionage of the 
scientific, economic and commercial 
assets of companies which fall 
victim to competitors or foreign 
powers, disruption of services 
necessary for the proper 
functioning of the economy and 
daily life, compromise of 
information related to our 
sovereignty and even, in certain 
circumstances, loss of human lives 
are nowadays the potential or 
actual consequences of the overlap 
between the digital world and 
human activity. (P.3) 
Germany 2011 Cybersecurity
Strategy
The interests of the private sector 
to protect itself against crime and 
espionage in cyberspace should also 
be adequately taken into account. 
(P.5)
The capabilities of law enforcement 
agencies, the Federal Office for 
Information Security and the 
private sector in combating cyber 
crime, also with regard to 
protection against espionage and 
sabotage, must be strengthened. 
(P.6)
A cyber attack is an IT attack in 
cyberspace directed against one or 
several other IT systems and aimed 
at damaging IT security. The aims 
of IT security, confidentiality, 
integrity and availability may all or 
individually be compromised. Cyber 
attacks directed against the 
confidentiality of an IT system, 
which are launched or managed by 
foreign intelligence services, are 
called cyber espionage. Cyber 
attacks against the integrity and 
availability of IT systems are 
termed cyber sabotage. (P.9) 
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Hungary 2013 National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
N/A 
India 2013 National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
N/A 
Italy 2013 National Strategic 
Framework for 
Cyberspace
Security
Cybercrime is a plague that can 
cause the bankruptcy of firms and 
the theft of their intellectual 
property, crippling the wealth of an 
entire nation. (P.5)
Cybercrime: all malicious activities 
with a criminal intent carried out 
in cyberspace, such as swindles or 
internet fraud, identify theft, 
stealing of data or of intellectual 
property. (P.13) 
Japan 2013 Cybersecurity
Strategy: Toward a 
World-Leading,
Resilient and 
Vigorous
Cyberspace
In the EU, in addition to natural 
disasters, terrorism and other 
situations, new transnational 
threats of economic espionage or 
state-sponsored cyber attacks have 
led to an awareness of the growing 
frequency and scale of cybersecurity 
incidents . . . (P.16–17) 
Private companies, educational 
institutions and research 
institutions possess intellectual 
property related information such 
as technological information, 
financial information, 
manufacturing technology 
information and drawings, as well 
as personal information such as 
client lists, personnel information 
and educational information, and 
other critical information. (P.25) 
Latvia 2010 Law on the Security 
of Information 
Technologies
N/A 
2014 Cyber Security 
Strategy of Latvia
N/A 
Lithuania 2011 Programme for the 
Development of 
Electronic
Information
Security (Cyber 
Security) for 2011–
2019
N/A 
Luxembourg 2011 National Strategy 
on Cyber Security 
Extensive coverage from pages 4–10. 
Malaysia 2006 National Cyber 
Security Policy 
THRUST 5: Research & 
Development Towards Self-
Reliance
Formalise the coordination and 
prioritization of cyber security 
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research and development activities 
Enlarge and strengthen the cyber 
security research community 
Promote the development and 
commercialization of intellectual 
properties, technologies and 
innovations through focused 
research and development 
Nurture the growth of cyber 
security industry (P.5) 
Netherlands 2011 The National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
The threats from other states 
mostly concern the theft of 
confidential or competition 
sensitive information (cyber 
espionage), while professional 
criminals mainly focus on digital 
fraud and theft of information. (P.7) 
More active approach to cyber 
espionage 
The Dutch government is 
committed to raising awareness 
among citizens, businesses, 
organization and government 
bodies about information security 
and privacy. This means that 
awareness campaigns will partly 
focus on increasing knowledge and 
insight into the risks of cyber 
espionage. On the other hand, the 
government also ensures that the 
issue is prioritized within the 
intelligence and security services, 
which are given the tools to better 
document cyber threats and 
investigate and combat advanced 
attacks. To this end, the 
intelligence and security services 
have combined their cyber 
capabilities in the Joint Sigint 
Cyber Unit (JSCU). 
Furthermore, the government will 
prioritize a better protection of data 
citizens share with the government 
and being more transparent about 
data management. (P.24) 
New Zealand 2011 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
Criminals are increasingly using 
cyber space to gain access to 
personal information, steal 
businesses’ intellectual property, 
and gain knowledge of sensitive 
government-held information for 
financial or political gain or other 
malicious purposes. (P.1) 
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Some of the most advanced and 
persistent cyber attacks on 
governments and critical 
infrastructure worldwide are 
thought to originate from foreign 
military and intelligence services or 
organised criminal groups. Media 
organisations around the world are 
reporting attacks on government 
systems, national infrastructure 
and businesses that have resulted 
in access to commercially sensitive 
information, intellectual property 
and state or trade secrets. (P.5) 
Norway 2012 National Strategy 
for Information 
Security
The trend toward targeted and 
professional hacking of critical ICT 
systems is increasing. Targeted 
espionage attacks against vital 
national security interests now 
constitute a significant challenge. 
Civil services, military units and 
private companies are all 
vulnerable to espionage and 
sabotage. Many countries are 
developing capabilies for espionage 
and warfare against critical 
infrastructure. We must assume 
that sophisticated sabotage and 
attacks will be directed against 
critical information resources, 
including the computer systems 
that control industrial processes 
and critical infrastructure. (P.12) 
Poland 2013 Cyberspace
Protection Policy 
N/A 
Qatar 2011 National ICT Plan 
2015: Advancing 
the Digital Agenda 
Protecting the intellectual property 
rights of digital content creators. 
(P.19)
Republic of 
Korea
2010 2010 Defense White 
Paper
N/A 
Romania 2013 Cyber Security 
Strategy and the 
National Action 
Plan on 
Implementation of 
the National Cyber 
Security
N/A 
Russia 2000 National Security 
Concept of the 
Russian Federation 
[R]einforcing the mechanisms of 
legal governance of relations in the 
field of intellectual property 
protection, and creating conditions 
for observance of the federally 
prescribed restrictions on access to 
confidential information. 
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Saudi Arabia 2013 Developing 
National
Information
Security Strategy 
for the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
N/A
Singapore 2013 National Cyber 
Security
Masterplan 2018 
N/A 
Slovak
Republic
2008 National Strategy 
for Information 
Security
N/A 
South Africa 2010 Cyber Security 
Policy
N/A 
Spain 2013 National Cyber 
Security: A 
Commitment for 
Everybody
The threats against information are 
those that cause the loss, miss-
handling, disclosure or misuse of 
information. 
Among these threats are: 
• Espionage. Within this category 
all varieties of espionage are 
included, from state espionage to 
industrial espionage. (P.17) 
2013 The National 
Security Strategy: 
Sharing a Common 
Project
Espionage has adapted to the new 
landscape of the globalised world 
and currently makes use of the 
possibilities provided by 
information and communication 
technologies. Aggressions by States, 
groups or individuals for the 
purpose of gaining information that 
gives them strategic, political or 
economic advantages have been a 
constant feature in history and 
continue to pose a major threat to 
security.
Economic espionage is of great 
importance in today’s competitive 
environment and consists of the 
illegal procurement of information, 
industrial property or critical 
technology, and even involves 
attempts to exert illegal influence 
on political decisions of an economic 
nature. Its potential impact is 
increasing on account of its ability 
to harm the economic system and 
affect citizens’ well-being.
Spain, like the rest of the EU and 
NATO members, faces hostile 
actions from other States. These 
actions are always contrary to 
national interests – regardless of 
whether they originate from within 
or outside Spanish territory – and 
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are particularly aggressive in 
situations of conflict or tension. 
Together with traditional espionage 
methods, these activities are 
increasingly based on sophisticated 
technological training programmes 
that can provide access to huge 
amounts of information and, in a 
worst-case scenario, to sensitive 
data. (P.33) 
Sweden 2010 Strategy for 
Information
Security in Sweden 
2010 – 2015 
N/A 
Switzerland 2012 National Strategy 
for Switzerland’s 
Protection Against 
Cyber Risks 
The private sector is thus very 
vulnerable to cyber risks, e.g. 
attacks to deceive, to obtain unjust 
financial gain or for economic 
espionage. Therefore, the inclusion 
of all stakeholders (e.g. private 
sector, in particular CI operators, 
ICT service or system providers) in 
the strategy is essential in order to 
protect against cyber risks. (P.6) 
Turkey 2013 National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
and 2013-2014 
Action Plan 
N/A 
United 
Kingdom
2011 Cyber Security 
Strategy
Some of the most sophisticated 
threats to the UK in cyberspace 
come from other states which seek 
to conduct espionage with the aim 
of spying on or compromising our 
government, military, industrial 
and economic assets, as well as 
monitoring opponents of their own 
regimes. (P.15) 
Organisations are not always 
aware of the new vulnerabilities 
that dependence on cyberspace can 
bring. Intellectual property and 
other commercially sensitive 
information (for example, business 
strategies) can be attractive 
targets. (P.16) 
The Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure delivers 
advice that aims to reduce the 
vulnerability of organisations in the 
national infrastructure to terrorism 
and other threats such as 
espionage, including those from 
cyberspace. (P.28) 
Business is the largest victim of 
crime and economic espionage 
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perpetrated through cyberspace. 
(P.32)
United States 2008 Comprehensive
National 
Cybersecurity
Initiative
N/A 
2011 Department of 
Defense Strategy 
for Operating in 
Cyberspace
Whether malicious insiders are 
committing espionage, making a 
political statement, or expressing 
personal disgruntlement, the 
consequences for DoD, and national 
security, can be devastating. (P.3) 
While the threat to intellectual 
property is often less visible than 
the threat to critical infrastructure, 
it may be the most pervasive cyber 
threat today. Every year, an 
amount of intellectual property 
larger than that contained in the 
Library of Congress is stolen from 
networks maintained by U.S. 
businesses, universities, and 
government departments and 
agencies. As military strength 
ultimately depends on economic 
vitality, sustained intellectual 
property losses erode both U.S. 
military effectiveness and national 
competitiveness in the global 
economy. (P.4) 
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Appendix B: Non-comprehensive Review of Civil  
Rights and Civil Liberties from G34 Nations
Country 
Name 
Year Title of Cybersecurity 
Strategy 
Quoted Provisions 
Armenia 2005 Armenia National 
Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace 
Privacy and civil liberties must be 
protected in the process. Because 
no cybersecurity plan can be 
unreceptive to sophisticated and 
intelligent attack, information 
systems must be able to operate 
while under attack and have the 
resilience to restore full operations 
quickly. (P.4) 
Australia 2009 Australian 
Government Cyber 
Security Strategy 
Australia must pursue cyber 
security policies that enhance 
individual and collective security 
while preserving Australians’ right 
to privacy and other fundamental 
values and freedoms. Maintaining 
this balance is a continuing 
challenge for all modern 
democracies seeking to meet the 
complex cyber security challenges 
of the future. (P.vi) 
Confronting and managing these 
risks must be balanced against the 
civil liberties of Australians, 
including the right to privacy, and 
the need to promote efficiency and 
innovation to ensure that Australia 
realises the full potential of the 
digital economy. (P.4) 
Austria 2013 Austrian Cyber 
Security Strategy 
Governance in the area of cyber 
security has to meet the high 
standards of the rule of law of the 
Austrian administration and 
guarantee compliance with human 
rights, in particular privacy and 
data protection as well as the 
freedom of expression and the right 
to information. (P.7) 
Belgium 2014 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
The text is only available in French 
and Dutch.  
Canada 2010 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
The Government is taking steps to 
protect cyberspace from becoming a 
criminal haven. We will deny cyber 
criminals the anonymity they are 
seeking while at the same time 
protecting the privacy of Canadians. 
(P.12) 
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Czech 
Republic 
2011 Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the 
Czech Republic 
There is no way how to achieve 
absolute cybernetic security. The 
Czech Republic will adopt measures 
based on realistic evaluation of 
risks and shall be appropriate to 
such risks. They will respect 
protection of privacy and basic 
rights as free access to information, 
freedom of speech and others. The 
measures shall be appropriate to 
the necessity to ensure security on 
one side and to respect basic rights 
and freedoms on the other side. 
(P.5) 
Denmark 2012 Danish Defense 
Agreement 2013–17 
N/A 
Estonia 2008 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
The procurement of national cyber 
security should be based on the 
following principles and guidelines:  
• cyber security action plans should 
be integrated into the routine 
processes of national security 
planning; 
• cyber security should be pursued 
through the co-ordinated efforts of 
all concerned stakeholders, of 
public and private sectors as well 
as of civil society; (P.7) 
In the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the issue of cyber security 
is the responsibility of the 
Committee for Information, the 
Computer and Communications 
Policy and its working groups, 
including the Working Party on 
Information Security and Privacy. 
The Committee has adopted several 
recommendations, including the 
Recommendation Concerning 
Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks 
(2002) and the Recommendation on 
Cross-border Co-operation in the 
Enforcement of Laws Protecting 
Privacy (2007). (P.25) 
Finland 2013 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
Protection of privacy means the 
protection against the unlawful or 
hurtful invasion of personal privacy. 
Protection of privacy includes the 
right to privacy and other associated 
rights in the processing of personal 
data. Personal data means any 
information on a private individual 
and any information on his/her 
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personal characteristics or personal 
circumstances, where these are 
identifiable as concerning him/her or 
the members of his/her family or 
household. (P.13) 
France 2011 Information 
Systems Defense 
and Security 
N/A 
Germany 2011 Cybersecurity 
Strategy 
N/A 
Hungary 2013 National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
N/A 
India 2013 National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
N/A 
Italy 2013 National Strategic 
Framework for the 
Security of 
Cyberspace 
Balancing these often diverging 
objectives is a complex endeavor, if 
one considers for instance how 
monitoring the technical 
functionality of networks is essential 
to allow the fulfillment of the right 
to privacy and the integrity of one’s 
communication appliances, or also 
how it can be difficult to find the 
right balance between the right to 
privacy and the fight against 
criminal activities such as child 
pornography, drugs smuggling, hate 
incitement, or terrorism planning - 
crimes that not only hurt individual 
and social liberties, but also 
undermine the very existence of an 
open, democratic and free Internet. 
(P.11–12). 
Japan 2013 Cybersecurity 
Strategy: Toward a 
World-Leading, 
Resilient and 
Vigorous 
Cyberspace 
As a result, cyberspace has 
provided us a variety of positive 
benefits including innovation, 
economic growth, and solutions for 
social issues while still ensuring 
freedom of expression and 
protection of privacy. (P.20) 
Latvia 2010 Law on the Security 
of Information 
Technologies 
N/A 
2014 Cyber Security 
Strategy of Latvia 
N/A 
Lithuania 2011 Programme for the 
Development of 
Electronic 
Information 
Security (Cyber 
Security) for 2011–
2019
The purpose of the Programme is to 
determine the objectives and tasks 
for the development of electronic 
information in order to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and 
accessibility of electronic 
information and services provided 
in cyberspace, safeguarding of 
electronic communication networks, 
information systems and critical 
information infrastructure against 
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incidents and cyber attacks, 
protection of personal data and 
privacy, as well as to set the tasks, 
implementation of which would 
allow total security of cyberspace 
and entities operating in this 
medium. (P.1) 
Luxembourg 2011 National Strategy 
on Cyber Security 
N/A 
Macedonia 2012 Strategy for 
Personal Data 
Protection in 
Republic of 
Macedonia 2012–
2016
Everyone has right to privacy. I 
own my privacy, is the motto of the 
Directorate for Personal Data 
Protection. Personal data 
protection is part of our everyday 
life and base for functioning of the 
modern and democratic society 
grounded on the constitutional 
guarantees for respecting the 
fundamental human rights. 
Guarantying privacy means 
establishing system for technical 
and organizational measures by the
controllers and processors of 
personal data, as well as high 
public awareness in the society as a 
unavoidable condition for reaction 
in case of breach of the right of 
privacy and evaluation of the 
achieved results. (P.4) 
Malaysia 2006 National Cyber 
Security Policy 
N/A 
Netherlands 2011 The National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
Together with private sector 
partners, the government works to 
develop standards that can be used 
to protect and improve the security 
of ICT products and services. (P.10) 
The Internet of Things (everything 
is connected to the internet) and 
hyperconnectivity (everything is 
connected to each other) promotes 
innovation and results in usability. 
At the same time, it raises the 
question of whether or not digitally 
linked products and services are 
actually safe and what the 
implications may be for privacy. 
(P.15)
New Zealand 2011 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
N/A 
Nigeria 2011 Cybersecurity Bill, 
2011
Anyone exercising any function 
under this section shall have due 
regard to the individual right to 
privacy under the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 and shall take appropriate 
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measures to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the data retained, 
processed or retrieved for the 
purpose of law enforcement. (P.8) 
Norway 2012 National Strategy 
for Information 
Security 
Personal privacy is also threatened 
by new methods of communication 
and ways to use information 
systems and the Internet. Identity 
abuse is a growing challenge for 
individuals, businesses and public 
authorities. (P.14) 
Poland 2013 Cyberspace 
Protection Policy 
N/A 
Qatar 2011 National ICT Plan 
2015: Advancing 
the Digital Agenda
ictQATAR is working with 
stakeholders to develop a legal 
framework to protect the privacy of 
personal information, which is 
critical to the healthy development 
of Qatar’s ICT sector. This 
framework, targeted for completion 
by the end ot [sic] 2011, will set the 
minimum level of privacy 
protection required for all sectors, 
including finance, education, 
health, and law enforcement. The 
framework will draw upon 
international best practices, while 
being innovative, forward looking, 
and technology neutral in its 
approach. (P.22) 
Republic of 
Korea 
2010 2010 Defense White 
Paper 
N/A 
Romania 2013 Cyber Security 
Strategy and the 
National Action 
Plan on 
Implementation of 
the National Cyber 
Security 
N/A 
Russia 2000 National Security 
Concept of the 
Russian Federation
[S]ecuring the constitutional rights 
and freedoms of man and the 
citizen to personal and family 
privacy, the secrecy of postal mail, 
telegraph, telephone and other 
communications, as well as to the 
defense of honor and reputation. 
Saudi Arabia 2013 Developing 
National 
Information 
Security Strategy 
for the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
N/A
Singapore 2013 National Cyber 
Security 
Masterplan 2018 
N/A 
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Slovak 
Republic 
2008 National Strategy 
for Information 
Security 
The approach to addressing 
security is driven by the need to 
resolve a problem which originated 
from scientific and technological 
development and has by now fully 
translated into a global social issue. 
Society seeks to resolve this 
problem and ensure both the 
protection of its valuable assets and 
individuals’ privacy. (P.4) 
South Africa  2010 Cyber Security 
Policy 
N/A 
Spain 2013 National Cyber 
Security, a 
Commitment for 
Everybody 
Spanish society must become aware 
of individual risks (privacy and 
intimacy) and collective risks 
(national security, economic, social 
and cultural prosperity) to which it 
would be exposed in the event of an 
irresponsible use of cyber space. 
The Government of Spain must 
lead an educational model and 
promote cyber security. (P.38) 
Sweden 2010 Strategy for 
Information 
Security in Sweden 
2010 – 2015 
N/A 
Switzerland 2012 National Strategy 
for Switzerland’s 
Protection Against 
Cyber Risks 
A second sphere where interests 
might conflict are personal rights:
Efforts to improve protective 
mechanisms in cyberspace (e.g. 
through stricter controls or 
surveillance), must be weighed 
against the protection of privacy. It 
is one of the tasks of this strategy, 
to take such considerations into 
account and to show how measures 
can be taken circumspectively. (P.7) 
Turkey 2013 National Cyber 
Security Strategy 
and 2013-2014 
Action Plan 
The principles of rule of law, 
fundamental human rights and 
freedoms and protection of privacy 
should be accepted as essential 
principles. (P.16) 
United 
Kingdom 
2011 Cyber Security 
Strategy 
We are determined to tackle the 
threats, but in a way which 
balances security with respect for 
privacy and fundamental rights. At 
home and internationally the UK 
Government will continue to work 
to ensure that cyberspace remains 
an open space – open to innovation 
and the free flow of ideas, 
information and expression. (P.5) 
Actions to strengthen our national 
security must also be consistent 
with our obligations, such as those 
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concerning freedom of expression; 
the right to seek, receive and 
impart ideas; and the right to 
privacy. Defending security should 
be consistent with our commitment 
to uphold civil liberties. Of course, 
these are well-established and 
ongoing debates, but cyberspace 
can bring them into focus in new 
ways, and more quickly than in 
other areas. (P.17) 
At home we will pursue cyber 
security policies that enhance 
individual and collective security 
while preserving UK citizens’ right 
to privacy and other fundamental 
values and freedoms. (P.22) 
United States 2008 Comprehensive 
National 
Cybersecurity 
Initiative  
Finally, the President directed that 
these activities be conducted in a 
way that is consistent with 
ensuring the privacy rights and 
civil liberties guaranteed in the 
Constitution and cherished by all 
Americans. (P.1) 
The CNCI was developed with 
great care and attention to privacy 
and civil liberties concerns in close 
consultation with privacy experts 
across the government. Protecting 
civil liberties and privacy rights 
remain fundamental objectives in 
the implementation of the CNCI. 
(P.2) 
2011 Department of 
Defense Strategy 
for Operating in 
Cyberspace 
DoD, working with its interagency 
and international partners, seeks to 
mitigate the risks posed to U.S. and 
allied cyberspace capabilities, while 
protecting and respecting the 
principles of privacy and civil 
liberties, free expression, and 
innovation that have made 
cyberspace an integral part of U.S. 
prosperity and security. (P.1) 
